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WHY JAPAN'S NEW PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW ISN'T
Andrew Marcuse
Abstract: The statutory language of Japan's 1994 Products Liability Act
envisions a strict liability regime that would replace the previous negligence-based
regime. This Comment reviews the development of the previous products liability
regime, then analyzes the 1994 Products Liability Act in relation to Civil Code articles
415, 570, and 709 as well as EC Directive 85/374, and the 1975 Draft Model Law on
Products Liability. The Comment concludes that because the 1994 Products Liability
Act incorporates the Civil Code articles and their judicial interpretations, without
addressing any of several structural and procedural barriers to suit, the 1994 Products
Liability Act cannot and will not impose strict liability on manufacturers.
I. INTRODUCTION
On July 1, 1994, the Japanese Diet passed a new and long-antici-
pated Products Liability Act (Seiz6butsu sekinin h() ("the Act"), which
went into effect on July 1, 1995.2 The Act purports to ease plaintiff's
burden by introducing to Japan a strict liability regime.3 However, a closer
examination of the Act reveals that it changes very little. While the Act
accomplishes several noteworthy goals, such as defining important terms
like "defect," "product," and "producer," 4 and freeing plaintiffs from the
burden of proving a manufacturer's negligence,5 in many ways the new Act
merely codifies previous decisions rendered by Japanese courts.6
I See Eugene A. Danaher, Products Liability Overhaul: Strict Liability Is Coming To Japan, NAT'L
L. J., Feb. 7. 1994, at 25; Robert C. Weber, Japanese Law Edges Westward, NAT'L L. J., Apr. 6, 1992, at
13. Various Japanese groups and agencies proposed products liability reform as early as 1975 and as
recently as December, 1993. See, e.g., Yasuhiro Fujita, Japan, in PRODUCTS LIABILITY: AN
INTERNATIONAL MANUAL OF PRACTICE 89 (Warren Freedman ed., 1987) (translation of 1975 Draft Model
Law On Product Liability); Danaher, supra, at 25 (citing three semi-official advisory council reports).
2 Law No. 85 (1994) [hereinafter PLA].
3 Article I of the Act reads as follows:
The purpose of this Act is to contribute to the stability and improvement of the national
livelihood, the sound development of the national economy, and the protection of injured
persons by stipulating the liability of producers, or the like for damages arising to a person s
life, body, or property caused by defective products.
PLA, art. 1, translated in ZENTARO KITAGAWA, DOING BUSINESS IN JAPAN, app. 4D-1 (1995)
(emphasis added).
4 Id. Article 2 of the Act defines "producer."
5 1994 Japan Bus. L. Guide (CCH) 99-070, at 100,063.
6 This thesis builds upon two theories promoted by Frank Upham. The ftrst theory is that in Japan,
cases "can embody and declare the existence of a new social consensus that is politically binding on the
PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL
Moreover, the Act does not ameliorate certain structural barriers and proce-
dural disincentives that may discourage plaintiffs in single-injury cases
from seeking legal redress.
Part I of this Comment provides a brief introduction to Japan's legal
institutions. Part II describes how Japanese courts developed the negli-
gence-based products liability regime into a near-strict liability regime and
details the legislative and administrative responses to that judicial
development. Part III analyzes the 1994 Products Liability Act in relation
to the 1975 Draft Model Law on Product Liability, European Economic
Community Council Directive 85/374,7 the prior negligence-based products
liability regime, and Japan's greater legal infrastructure. This Comment
concludes that the new Act merely codifies the previous judicial develop-
ment of the relevant Civil Code articles, reinforces political restraints on
judicial lawmaking, 8 and demonstrates the Diet's preference for informal
governance and dispute resolution.
II. BACKGROUND: A BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO THE JAPANESE LEGAL
SYSTEM
The modern history of Japan's legal infrastructure is well-docu-
mented. 9 Until the mid-nineteenth century, Japan possessed a feudal law
system largely designed to ensure the continued strength of the hereditary
samurai class.10  During the Meiji Restoration,l civil, commercial, and
criminal codes based on French and German models supplanted this feudal
society as a whole as well as the specific defendants." FRANK UPHAM, LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN
POSTWAR JAPAN 216 (1987). The second is that legislation follows litigation as a means of
institutionalizing and controlling societal change. Id. at 18-21. See also 1993 Japan Bus. L. Guide (CCH)
T10-620, at 8,501.
7 See RALPH H. FOLSOM, EUROPEAN UNION BUSINESS LAW: SOURCEBOOK 3-B-I, available in
WESTLAW, TP-ALL Database (1995). The new Act is largely based on Council Directive 85/374. See
infra Part II1.
8 As one scholar puts it, "The courts plow the field, and the legislature freezes it." Interview with
John 0. Haley, Garvey, Schubert, & Barer Professor of Law, University of Washington School of Law, in
Seattle, WA. (Sept. 24, 1995).
9 There are any number of outstanding treatises and textbooks on Japan's legal history and
institutions. These include, but are not limited to: JOHN 0. HALEY, AUTHORITY WITHOUT POWER (1991);
JOHN H. MERRYMAN ET AL., THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION: EUROPE, LATIN AMERICA, AND EAST ASIA
(John H. Merryman, et al. eds., 1994); LAW IN JAPAN (Alfred T. Von Mehren ed., 1963); THE JAPANESE
LEGAL SYSTEM: INTRODUCTORY CASES & MATERIALS (Hideo Tanaka ed., 1976).
10 See JOHN W. HALL, GOVERNMENT AND LOCAL POWER IN JAPAN 500 TO 1700, 370-74 (1966).
11 The Meiji period dates from 1868 to 1912. See, e.g., Chin Kim & Craig M. Lawson, The Law of
the Subtle Mind: The Traditional Japanese Conception of Law, 28 INT'L. AND COMP. L. Q. 491, 494
(1979).
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law system. 12 Civil law systems generally discourage judicial creativity, 13
but the Japanese judiciary demonstrated remarkable interpretive skills
during the early part of this century' 4 as they synthesized Japanese cultural
values and the rules imposed by the new codes. 15
A number of alternative dispute resolution ("ADR") mechanisms also
developed during this period.16 These ADR mechanisms include kankai
(reconcilement), ch6tei (mediation), and mediation by police. 17 Some
authors trace these mechanisms back to Tokugawa-era resolution processes
instigated by the peasant and merchant classes in response to the perceived
inadequacies of the bakufu's legal system.18  Others believe that the
Tokugawa-era legal system met disputants' needs,19 and that ADR mecha-
nisms originated in twentieth-century legislation.20 There is no doubt,
however, that ADR and other extra judicial mechanisms remain central to
the Japanese legal system in the late twentieth century. 21
12 HALEY, supra note 9, at 70.
13 See JOHN H. MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION 36 (2d ed. 1987).
14 HALEY, supra note 9, at 85; see also Kenzo Takayanagi, Development of Japanese Law Since
1867, in THE JAPANESE LEGAL SYSTEM 164, 188 (Hideo Tanaka ed., 1976) (originally published as A
Century of Innovation: The Development of Japanese Law, 1868-1961, in LAW IN JAPAN, supra note 9, at
15-40.
15 HALEY, supra note 9, at 85 ("In lawsuit after lawsuit where the consequence of casting traditional
relationships in terms of enforceable rights produced harsh results .... the courts modified and adapted the
rules of the code to conform to accepted, customary norms.").
16 Takeyoshi Kawashima, Dispute Resolution In Contemporary Japan, in LAW IN JAPAN, supra note
9, at 40, 53-54, 59.
17 Id. at 52-56. Kawashima does not give the Japanese equivalent for "mediation by police."
18 Id. at 53 (citing the Stenographic Record of the House of Representatives' Committees in the 51 st
Session of the Imperial Diet (1926)). Bakufu is Japanese shorthand for the Tokugawa shogunate. See
SANSEIDO'S NEW CONCISE JAPANESE-ENGLISH DICTIONARY 44 (1985).
19 See HALEY, supra note 9, at 57-58 (noting the role of Tokugawa magistrates in the development
of private law).
20 Hideo Tanaka, Jittei H6gaku Nyifmon [Introduction to the Study of Positive Law], translated in
part in THE JAPANESE LEGAL SYSTEM, supra note 9, at 492, 493-495 (Hideo Tanaka ed., 1976). These
latter two theories undercut arguments that the Japanese have a cultural dislike of litigation and a
predisposition towards ADR (for an example of a culturalist argument, see Kim & Lawson, supra note 1I.
at 502). Culturalists and rationalists alike are criticized for overstating their cases in Hideo Tanaka, The
Role of Law in Japanese Society: Comparisons with the West, in 19 U. B. C. L. REV. 375 (1985).
1 See UPHAM, supra note 6, at 18-22 (describing administrative processes for resolving pollution
and sex-discrimination complaints); Richard S. Miller, Apples vs. Persimmons: The Legal Profession in
Japan and the United States, 39 J. LEGAL EDUC. 27, 36 (1989) (describing arbitration of insurance disputes
arising out of auto accidents); Koichi Hamada et al., The Evolution and Economic Consequences of
Product Liability Rules in Japan, in LAW AND TRADE ISSUES IN THE JAPANESE ECONOMY 83, 85-88 (G.R.
Saxonhouse & Kozo Yamamura eds., 1986) (describing government and industry involvement in
"consumer centers," where injured consumers negotiate for compensation). However, in some areas ADR
appears to impede progress. See Tamie L. Bryant, Marital Dissolution In Japan: Legal Obstacles and
Their Impact, in LAW AND SOCIETY IN CONTEMPORARY JAPAN 221, 225-26 (John 0. Haley ed., 1988).
The predilection for informal, extrajudical resolution of products liability disputes is explored infra.
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Japan's legal system underwent further change. After the Second
World War, the 1947 Constitution established an American-style
independent judiciary with inherent powers of broad review, 22 but did not
impose a guaranteed right to jury trial23 or other common law mechanisms,
such as formal discovery. As a result, Japan's modem legal system is a
synthesis of European civil law institutions, American common law
institutions, and Japanese ADR institutions.24 However, it remains a very
compact system. There may be as few as two thousand judges in all of
Japan.2 5 There is little chance of increasing their numbers, because virtually
all judges and trial attorneys or litigators graduate from one relatively small
institute, 26 and recent graduates prefer to become litigators rather than join
the judiciary.2 7 The small judiciary handles a tremendous caseload,
28
although some pressure is relieved by funneling disputes into ADR.
29
In products liability suits, as in other suits, the Japanese legal system
poses barriers to litigation. For example, clients must post substantial
retainer fees up front,30 and must also disburse expensive court filing
fees.3 1  However, clients need not subsidize discovery costs, because
22 Lawrence W. Beer, Japan's Constitutional System and Its Judicial Interpretation, in LAW AND
SOCIETY IN CONTEMPORARY JAPAN, supra note 21, at 14. The creation of Japan's postwar Constitution is
one of the most interesting episodes in Japan's modem history. Charles L. Kades, The American Role in
Revisinfg Japan's Imperial Constitution, 104 POL. Sci. Q. 215 (1989), offers a fascinating account.
2 
Nobutoshi Yamanouchi & Samuel J. Cohen, Understanding the Incidence of Litigation in Japan:
A Structural Analysis, 25 INT'L LAW. 443, 449 n.32 (1991). Legislative act provided jury trial of right in
serious criminal cases between 1928 and 1943, but the statute was suspended during the Second World
War and never renewed. Id. at 450 n.34. Some scholars have long held that the jury system would be an
appropriate addition to modem civil tort actions in Japan. See, e.g., Ichiro Kato, The Concerns of Japanese
Tort Law Today, in I L. IN JAPAN: AN ANNUAL 65, 91 (1967) (Rex Coleman trans.).
24 Younghee Jin Ottley & Bruce L. Ottley, Product Liability In Japan: An Introduction To A
Developing Area Of Law, 14 GA. J. INT'L. & COMp. L. 29,32 (1984).
2 J. Mark Ramseyer, The Cost of the Consensual Myth: Barriers to Antitrust Enforcement and
Institutional Barriers to Litigation In Japan, 94 YALE L. J. 604, 634 (1985). See also HALEY, supra note
9, at 106-108.
26 In order to become a judge, prosecutor, or trial attorney or litigator (bengoshi), one must graduate
from the Legal Training and Research Institute, which admits no more than 500 applicants per year.
Edward 1. Chen, The National Law Examination of Japan, 39 J. LEGAL EDUC. 1, 7 (1989).
27 Id. at 18-19; Miller, supra note 21, at 27. Yet, trial attorneys or litigators remain nearly as scarce
as judges - there are only 13,000 bengoshi in Japan. Miller, supra note 21, at 27. Japan thus suffers a
dearth of trial attorneys or litigators when compared to other civil law countries, much less the United
States. See Chen, supra note 26, at 20.
28 HALEY, supra note 9, at 108.
29 See Miller, supra note 21.
30 Miller, supra note 21, at 34; Ramseyer, supra note 25, at 633; Yamanouchi & Cohen, supra note
23, at 448-49; Tsuneo Matsumoto, Japan, 15 U. HAW. L. REv. 523, 578 (1993) (part of a symposium
entitled Beyond Compensation: Dealing with Accidents in the 21st Century).
31 Yananouchi & Cohen, supra note 23, at 453; Miller, supra note 21, at 33.
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discovery (as it is known in the United States and elsewhere) is
nonexistent. 32 Also, Japanese trials are unlike their Western counterparts in
that there may be delays not only in securing a trial date, but also
intermittent and lengthy delays throughout the trial process itself.3 3
Damage awards are limited, including damages for pain and suffering; 34
there is some evidence that the judiciary independently establishes and
applies arbitrary figures. 35  Often, injunctive relief is not a viable
alternative. 36 It is widely believed that this combination of scarce counsel,
high up-front costs, lack of discovery, substantial delay, and limited
remedies significantly reduces the incidence of litigation in Japan. 37 These
elements also affected the development of Japan's negligence-based
products liability regime.
Ill. THE DEVELOPMENT OF JAPAN'S PREVIOUS PRODUCTS LIABILITY
REGIME
Prior to the enactment of the 1994 Products Liability Act, Japan's
products liability law was unconsolidated. 38 Nominally founded on several
32 Yamanouchi & Cohen, supra note 23, at 445-47.
33 Fujita, supra note 1, at 40; J. Mark Ramseyer, The Reluctant Litigant Revisited, 14 1. JAPANESE
STUD. Ill at 116-17 (1988). According to Fujita, it appears that Japanese trials are made up of disjointed
and intermittent hearings largely because there is no jury being pressured for a quick resolution.
34 Yamanouchi & Cohen, supra note 23, at 451.
35 Miller, supra note 21, at 35; HALEY, supra note 9, at 115; Matsumoto, supra note 30, at 579.
36 HALEY, supra note 9, at 118.
37 There are many theories about the relative lack of litigation in Japan. Some authors cite native
cultural factors. See, e.g., Kim & Lawson, supra note i1, at 501. Others proffer economic arguments. See.
e.g., J. Mark Ramseyer & Minoru Nakazato, The Rational Litigant: Settlement Amount and Verdict Rates
in Japan, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 263 (1989); but see Robert B. Leflar, Personal Injury Compensation Systems
in Japan: Values Advanced and Values Undermined, 15 U. HAW. L. REv. 742, 755-756 (1993) (criticizing
Ramseyer for sweeping generalizations). And to further complicate things, reported litigation rates
demonstrate no steady trend. See, e.g., HALEY, supra note 9, at 98, 119 (rising rate of first-instance trial
proceedings and new civil actions); Yamanouchi & Cohen, supra note 23, at 443 n.2 (civil cases increasing
through 1984); Matsumoto, supra note 30, at 577 (cases filed in district courts dropped from 220,000 in
1980 to 190,000 in 1990). Still, the perception ofnonlitigiousness shows little sign of abating, even among
the Japanese. See, e.g., Ramseyer, supra note 33, at 112; Kim & Lawson, supra note I1, at 506-07. In the
end, the truth probably lies somewhere in the middle: perhaps traditional Japanese values slightly depress
the inclination to litigate, which inclination is strongly reinforced by the substantial economic and
structural disincentives to suit. Cf Tanaka, The Role of Law in Japanese Society, supra note 20, at 386-87
(noting that the traditional Japanese attitude towards law is "noticeably different" from Western attitudes,
and also noting the development of Japanese "rights conciousness.").
38 David Cohen & Karen Martin, Western Ideology, Japanese Product Safety, 19 U. B. C. L. REV.
315, 324 (1985).
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Civil Code articles,39 the substance of Japanese products liability law
developed through several distinct mechanisms. First, creative judicial
interpretation of the Civil Code articles resulted in several groundbreaking
decisions. 40  Contemporaneously, mediation produced structured settle-
ments in large, highly publicized suits as well as more mundane cases. 41
Then, subsequent legislation codified both judicial decisions and extra
judicial settlements, and created new institutions to resolve similar
situations without resorting to the legal system. 42
A. The Contract Approach to Products Liability
The foundation of modem Japanese products liability law rests upon
Civil Code articles 415, 570, and 709.4 3  Articles 415 and 570 sound in
contract, whereas as article 709 sounds in tort.44 Article 415 provides a
contractual remedy if an obligor negligently fails in performing an
obligation or duty. 45  In a seller-buyer relationship, the seller must
overcome a presumption of negligence. 46 Interestingly, privity of contract
is not an absolute requirement. 47 A seller may rebut the presumption of
liability by proving the absence of defect at the time of sale, or by utilizing
other standard contractual defenses, such as express disclaimers, statutes of
limitation or repose, and liquidated damages clauses. 48 While article 415
generally limits damages to the replacement cost or value of the subject
39 Zentaro Kitagawa, Products Liability, in DOING BUSINESS IN JAPAN XIII §§ 4.01[1], 4.07[l]
(Zentaro Kitagawa ed., 1989) [hereinafter Kitagawa (1989)]. The Civil Code provisions remain relevant
not only because they are the foundation of all earlier products liability law in Japan, but also because the
new Act is prospective; thus, any products liability actions arising out of incidents that occurred prior to
July 1, 1995 (the activation date of the new Act) will base liability on the Civil Code articles.
40 Id. § 4.05[5].
41 Cohen & Martin, supra note 38, at 330-31.
42 See discussion of subsequent legislation and administrative remedies, infra Part III.D. The reader
may also wish to consider Professor Haley's comment, supra note 8.
43 Kitagawa (1989), supra note 39, §§ 4.03[2], 4.06[2].
44 Kitagawa (1989), supra note 39, §§ 4.03[2], 4.06[2].
45 The text of article 415 is as follows: "[i]f an obligor fails to perform in accordance with the main
sense of the obligation-duty, the obligee may demand compensation for damages; the same shall apply in
the cases where performance becomes impossible for any reason imputable to the obligor." Kitagawa
(1989), supra note 39, § 4.06[1], § 4.06[2].
46 Cohen & Martin, supra note 38, at 333.
47 Kitagawa (1989), supra note 39, § 4.06[1] (discussing Kanmaki v. Ohashi, 725 Hanrei Jih6 19
(Gifu Dist. Ct., Dec. 27, 1973)).
48 Kitagawa (1989), supra note 39, § 4.06[3]; Fujita, supra note 1, at 8-9. These defenses also apply
to suits under article 570. Fujita, supra note 1, at 5.
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matter of the suit, "expanded damages" (consequential damages) may be
recovered as well.
49
Unlike article 415, article 570 specifically addresses defective
products,50 establishing that sellers are strictly liable for injuries caused by
products with latent defects. 5 1 However, liability under article 570 is
available only if the purchaser had no knowledge of the defect at the time of
purchase,52 and liability exists only where there is privity between the seller
and the purchaser. 53 Damages are limited to the price of the product. 54 An
injured purchaser may subrogate the seller's claim against the manufacturer
in the event that a seller is insolvent, but subrogation is otherwise
unavailable. 55  Thus, although article 570 establishes a seller's strict
liability, it is disfavored because of its severely limited scope and equally
limited remedies.
56
B. The Tort Approach to Products Liability
The majority of products liability actions are brought in tort, under
article 709. 57 Like article 415, article 709 is broadly worded58 and applied
to the products liability sphere through liberal judicial construction. 59
Unlike article 415, there is no presumption of manufacturer negligence. 60
The plaintiff must prove that an injury occurred, the existence of a defect, a
causal link between that defect and the injury, and the fault of the manufac-
49 Kitagawa (1989), supra note 39, § 4.06[l1; see also Ottley & Ottley, supra note 24, at 43 (if the
injured party proves both adequate causation and foreseeability of harm, Civil Code article 416 permits
recovery of damages arising through "special circumstances").
50 Fujita, supra note 1, at 4.
51 Kitagawa (1989), supra note 39, § 4.06[2].
52 Fujita, supra note 1, at 5. Defendant's lack of knowledge is not a defense.
53 Fujita, supra note 1, at 5.
54 Fujita, supra note 1, at 4. Expanded damages are not available, though damages interest at the
judicial rate (five percent per annum).
55 Consonant with article 415, subrogation is permitted by reading together article 570 and article
423. Fujita, supra note 1, at 5.
56 Fujita. supra note I, at 5.; cf Ottley & Ottley, supra note 24, at 45 (contract theory as a whole is
"largely a theoretical basis for recovery"). But see KIlURo ARITA, PRODUCTS LIABILITY IN JAPAN LAW:
PRINCIPLES AND CASES 3, 14, 17 (1980) (informal publication, Kinki University, Osaka, Japan) (reporting
three cases decided under article 415, involving prescription drugs, imported badminton sets, and
automobile steering wheels).
57 Fujita, supra note I, at 12 ("[p]ractitioners and the courts clearly prefer to utilize the tort approach
of Article 709..."); see also Ottley & Ottley, supra note 24, at 45.
58 Article 709 reads, "[olne who violates the rights of another intentionally or negligently is
responsible to render compensation for harm arising therefrom." Fujita, supra note 1, at 12.
59 Fujita, supra note 1, at 12.
60 Kitagawa (1989), supra note 39, § 4.05[5].
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turer or distributor in making or marketing the product.6' In defending
against a products liability suit in tort, manufacturers or sellers may invoke
a number of arguments. 62 As with claims in contract, defendants may raise
general denials, introduce evidence of adequate warning, and apply
disclaimers and statutes of limitation or repose. Comparative fault may also
play a role.63 The defendant may also attack the plaintiff's proof of
causation, plead unforeseeabililty, or raise state-of-the-art defenses. 64
C. A BriefAnalysis of Reported Products Liability Decisions
A true understanding of Japan's previous products liability regime
can be gained only by analyzing reported products liability decisions.65
Here, analysis of reported decisions demonstrates that Japan's previous
products liability regime evolved away from the simple,66 negligence-based
Civil Code articles towards a near-strict liability standard that foreshadowed
61 Fujita, supra note 1, at 13. Because no contractual relationship exists to create a duty on the part
of the manufacturer or distributor towards the plaintiff, the plaintiff must show that the relevant party's
intentional or negligent actions could produce the injury in question.
62 Fujita, supra note 1, at 25. The government may find itself defending such suits as well-in fact,
it has been named a party defendant in nearly every mass-injury products liability case of record. See, e.g.
Fujita. supra note 1, at 47-54. Obviously, there is no rule of sovereign immunity in Japan. Kitagawa
(1989), supra note 39, § 4.05[6]. An in-depth analysis of the government's role in products liability cases
is beyond the scope of this Comment.
63 Adachi et al., Japan, in 2 PRODuCTS LIABILITY: A MANUAL OF INTERNATIONAL PRACTICE 45
(Stucki & Allenberger, eds., 198 1).
64 Fujita, supra note 1, at 25.
65 At first, case analysis seems an inappropriate tool for investigating Japanese law because stare
decisis is not officially recognized in civil law countries. Cf MERRYMAN, supra note 13, at 22; Hamada et
al., supra note 21, at 88. In addition, Japanese judges flexibly wield their powers of statutory
interpretation. Hamada et al., supra note 21, at 88; 1993 Japan Bus. L. Guide, supra note 6, 10-620. But
see Ottley & Ottley, supra note 24, at 56 ("courts in civil law countries do not have the same power of
interpretation as common law courts"). In context, however, it seems that Ottley and Ottley are addressing
the absence of stare decisis, not a lack of interpretive powers; this impression is reinforced by their citation
to Merryman. Ottley & Ottley, supra note 24, at 56 n.133. They likely intend the reader to explore
Merryman's Chapter VII (entitled "The Interpretation of Statutes") which concludes that civil law courts
have de facto powers of statutory interpretation, but lack a formal tradition of stare decisis. MERRYMAN,
supra note 13, at 39-47 (especially 46-47).
Yet, Japanese judges endeavor to harmonize the outcomes of similar cases. Miller, supra note 21, at
35; Ramseyer & Nakazato, supra note 37, at 269, 270. Thus, their decisions are relatively accurate
predictors of future outcomes, (and well worth analyzing in that light). See Miller, supra note 21, at 35;
Ramseyer & Nakazato, supra note 37, at 269, 270. Indeed, courts' decisions in Japan also undergird many
later legislative and administrative responses to products liability (the relationship between court cases and
later legislative and administrative actions are explored in depth below).6
6 Hamada et al., supra note 21, at 88, 89.
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the provisions of the sophisticated new Act.67 The cases may be divided
into at least two categories: single-injury cases 68 and mass-injury cases.
While there may be any number of consumer injuries caused by defective
products, 69 very few single-injury incidents70 become the subject of a suit.
Plaintiffs have prevailed in single-injury cases characterized by several
factors: an obvious causal link between injury and defect; 71 a relatively
self-evident, easy to prove, or well-documented defect; 72 and a clear breach
of a clear duty on the part of the manufacturer or seller.73
Depending on the product involved or the injury suffered, courts
require a lesser burden of proof than the Civil Code articles would other-
67 The new statute is relatively sophisticated in that it specifically addresses products liability,
defines what constitutes "defect," establishes explicit defenses, and encompasses periods of limitation and
repose - all in one small package. See KITAGAWA, supra note 3.
68 All single-injury cases are cited from ARITA, supra note 56. Again, there is a very small universe
of reported single-injury cases: other authors reference many of the 26 single-injury tort cases collected by
Arita. See, e.g., Cohen & Martin, supra note 38, at 330 n.66, 331 n.72; Fuijta, supra note I, at 54 n.75, 55
nn.76, 77; Hamada et al., supra note 21, at 92 n.22; Kitagawa (1989), supra note 39, § 4.05[91 n.37; Ottley
& Ottley, supra note 24, at 51 n. 112 (citing a lower court decision for which Arita supplies a later appellate
decision). However, these perfunctory citations do not provide as much detail as Arita's collection.
Therefore, citation is to Arita's more complete work.
Hamada et al., report fewer than one hundred cases (encompassing both single-injury and mass-
tort suits) on the books as of 1982, while they and others report a rapid increase in cases over time.
Hamada et al., supra note 21, at 95; see also Kitagawa (1989), supra note 39, § 4.04[2]. It is important to
remember that they are reporting new case decisions, not new case filings. Many of the cases decided in
the late 1970s and early 1980s were suits involving mass-tort victim's associations-a glut of cases
initiated in the late 1960s and early 1970s. See, e.g., Fujita, supra note 1, 49-54. Recall that at least one
scholar reports a substantial decrease in the number of new case filings. See Matsumoto, supra note 30
(reporting a drop in new case filings between 1980 and 1990).
69 Hamada et al., supra note 21, at 95.
70 Single-injury cases are defined here as those cases involving a single defective product which
causes injury. More than one plaintiff may be injured (such as in a car accident arising out of a defective
repair job), but no more than one set of plaintiffs is exposed to the danger. This term is suggested by
Cohen and Martin's observation that "[w]hether the plaintiff's injuries occur in isolation or instead are part
of a larger products liability disaster will likely have a significant impact... The isolated plaintiff... will
often have considerable difficulty." Cohen & Martin, supra note 38, at 330 (emphasis added); see also
Fujita, supra note 1, at 70. Kitagawa also uses the term, but does not define exactly what he means. See.
e.g.. Kitagawa (1989), supra note 39, § 4.04[l]. Here, the term is used to better demonstrate the disparate
treatment of mass-tort cases.
71 See, e.g., ARITA, supra note 56, at 50-52, 55 (citing four cases where defective propane gas
containers or pipes leaked and exploded, causing death and injury).
72 See, e.g., ARITA, supra note 56, at 39, 43, 47, 70 (citing four cases respectively involving fugu
poisoning at a restaurant). The poisonous nature offugu, or blowfish, is an obvious danger. See Hamada
et al., supra note 21, at 92. Other examples include an improperly installed hot water spigot; a toxic root
extract (known to be poisonous in certain quantities); and a defective copier (well-documented by plaintiff
and defendant).
73 See, e.g., ARITA, supra note 56, at 50-52, 55, 59 (manufacturer of defective car seat had duty to
conform to industry and government minimum standards; other defendants obviously had duties not to
poison, scald, or electrocute their customers).
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wise indicate.74 Manufacturers of food products and pharmaceuticals, as
well as physicians at well-equipped hospitals, must overcome a presumption
of negligence imposed by the court-created "special negligence" 75, rule.
Yet, it appears that in order to prevail a plaintiff still must positively prove
the existence of a defect. 76 Where such proof is lacking or difficult to
achieve, a plaintiff will not prevail. 77 Moreover, damages will be reduced
in proportion to a plaintiff's degree of fault.78 In some cases, comparative
fault may offset most of the award.79
On the other hand, plaintiffs in mass-tort suits and large-scale
products liability cases8O have been uniformly successful, whether by
74 Fujita, supra note 1, at 13.
75 The phrase is Kitagawa's. Kitagawa (1989), supra note 39, § 4.05[4].
76 Arita documents the use of res ipsa loquitur theory. ARITA, supra note 56, at 23-25; see also
Kitagawa (1989), supra note 39, § 4.05[5] n.18 (separate cases in which defendant auto repair shops failed
to rebut presumption of defective repair and were held liable). In two other cases, plaintiffs' claims were
denied because they failed positively to establish the existence of a defect. See ARITA, supra note 56, at
41-43 (no recovery in cases where defects not positively shown to cause a dump truck bed to fall, or to
cause small car to weave dangerously across road at highway speeds). This contrasts with several of the
mass-tort cases discussed below. There, the judiciary allowed proof of injury to establish a rebuttable
presumption of defect where the injury could have been caused (epidemiologically speaking) by the
alleged defect. See Hamada et al., supra note 21, at 91; Fujita, supra note I, at 15; Cohen & Martin, supra
note 38, at 331; Kitagawa (1989), supra note 39, § 4.05[5] n.20. In most of the other mass-injury tort
cases, the courts applied the "special negligence" rule for manufacturers of pharmaceuticals and food
products, so that theories of epidemiological causation or res ipsa loquitur became superfluous. See. e.g..
Kitagawa (1989), supra note 39, § 4.05[5].
77 ARITA, supra note 56, at 41-43; 57-58; see also Fujita, supra note 1, at 70.
78 Courts applied a comparative fault analysis in five out of twelve single-injury cases where
plaintiff prevailed. See, ARITA, supra note 56, at 68-74.
79 Kitagawa (1989), supra note 39, § 4.05[9] n.37. But see ARITA, supra note 56, at 72 (reporting
the opposite ratio of liability in favor of plaintiff).
0 These cases include the egg-tofu case; the fish-cake fritters case; the Morinaga Dairy case; the rice
oil cases; the thalidomide cases; and the SMON cases. Full citation to these cases may be found in the
notes accompanying the discussion of them, infra notes 82 - 99.
Virtually every work on modem Japanese tort law makes reference to these large-scale cases. See.
e.g., Cohen & Martin, supra note 38, at 330; Fujita, supra note 1, at 47-54; Hamada et al., supra note 21, at
83, 89-90; Kitagawa (1989), supra note 39, § 4.04[2]4.04[5]; and Ottley & Ottley, supra note 24, at 47-
55. The "Big Four" pollution suits laid much of the groundwork for these products liability cases: in all
four suits, the courts relaxed the plaintiffs' burden of proof on the causation element, and all four courts
decided for the plaintiffs. The "Big Four" include the Itai-ltai disease case, Komatsu v. Mitsui Kinzoku
Kogyo, 635 HANREI JIHO 17 (Toyama Dist. Ct., June 30, 1971); aff'd, 674 HANREI JIHO 25 (Nagoya High
Ct., Kanazawa Br., Aug. 9, 1972); the two Minimata disease trials, Ono v. Showa Denko K.K., 642 HANREI
JIHO 96 (Niigata Dist. Ct., Sept. 29, 1971), and Watanabe v. Chisso K.K., 696 HANREI JIHO 15 (Kumamoto
Dist. Ct., Mar. 20, 1973); and the Yokkaichi air pollution trial, Shiono v. Showa Yokkaichi Sekiyu K.K..
672 HANRE JIHO 30 (Tsu Dist. Ct., Yokkaichi Br., July 24, 1972), cited in Julian Gresser, The 1973
Japanese Law for the Compensation of Pollution Related Health Damage: An Introductory Assessment, in
LAW AND SOCIETY IN CONTEMPORARY JAPAN: AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES 165 nn. 50, 54, 57 (John 0. Haley
ed., 1988).
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rendered verdict or negotiated settlement. In the Morinaga Dairy case,8 1
twelve thousand infants (some of whom later died) were sickened by
arsenic-tainted powdered milk.8 2 A civil action brought against the manu-
facturer and the government8 3 settled out of court after the defendants
agreed to establish a fund that would pay the victims' medical costs and
provide annuities. 8
4
In the Kanemiyu sh6 case,8 5 over ten thousand individuals were
sickened by cooking oil contaminated with PCB.8 6 Multiple tort actions
were filed against the cooking oil manufacturer, the PCB manufacturer, and
the government.8 7 One court invoked the "special negligence" rule88 to
create a presumption of fault, shifting the burden of proof from the plaintiffs
to the defendants.8 9 Another court also invoked the special negligence rule,
not to create a presumption of fault, but rather to find that the defendants
did not meet the high duty of care imposed by the rule.90 Both courts found
for the plaintiffs; the decisions were appealed to intermediate courts, and
then the Supreme Court.9 1 In 1987, the parties agreed to a compromise
suggested by the Supreme Court.92
In the thalidomide case, 93 sixty-three plaintiff families sued the gov-
ernment and the manufacturers of Isomin for failure to warn of the drug's
81 Japan v. Ooka, 356 HANREi JIHO 7 (Tokushima Dist. Ct., Oct. 25, 1963), rev'd and remanded,
447 HANREI JIHO 31 (Takamatsu High Ct., Mar. 31, 1966), appeal dismissed, 547 HANREI JIH6 92 (Sup.
Ct., Feb. 27, 1969); 302 HANREI TAIMUZU 123 (Tokushima Dist. Ct., Nov. 28, 1973), cited in Fujita, supra
note 1, at 82 n.69.
82 Fujita, supra note 1, at 48.
83 The government was named as a defendant for failing to insure sanitary food production. Fujita,
supra note 1, at 48.
84 Fujita, supra note i, at 48-49. In a related action, criminal sanctions were imposed on the dairy's
manufacturing section chief for failing to meet his high duty of care; sentence was suspended.
85 There were actually two cases, which are usually cited together. Those cases are Kubota v.
Kanemi Soko K.K., 866 HANREI JIHO 21 (Fukuoka Dist. Ct., Oct. 5, 1977); and Noguchi v. Kanemi Soko
K.K., 881 HANREI JIHO 17 (Fukuoka Dist. Ct., Kokura Br., Mar. 10, 1978).
86 Fujita, supra note 1, at 49. The defendant used the chemical as a heat-transfer medium in the
manufacturing process.
87 Fujita, supra note i, at 49.
88 Kitagawa (1989), supra note 39, § 4.04[4].
89 Fujita, supra note I, at 50.
90 Fujita, supra note 1, at 50.
91 Fujita, supra note 1, at 50.
92 Kitagawa (1989), supra note 39, § 4.04[4]. The defendant was not held liable; government's
liability was not decided.
9 There were at least eight separate suits filed against Isomin manufacturers. Kitagawa (1989),
supra note 39, § 4.04[2]. The National Thalidomide Litigation Plaintiffs' Group represented the plaintiffs
in major negotiations.
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known side-effects. 94 The plaintiffs' representative association, the drug
company, and the government ultimately settled out of court. 95 The defen-
dants acknowledged their liability and agreed to a flexible compensation
scheme that provided for both current medical costs and future welfare
payments. 96 The settlement agreement also created a separate foundation or
welfare center to handle the victims' ongoing medical, education, and
employment needs.
97
Finally, the SMON cases 98 resulted after a neurological disease
affected ten thousand people who ingested a drug used to treat diarrhea.99
At its height, this litigation involved approximately six thousand plaintiffs
in over twenty district courts. Early decisions favored the plaintiffs, and
defendants appealed. !00 All of the plaintiffs eventually agreed to a detailed
settlement. 101
The outcomes of these cases highlight the judicial development of
Japanese products liability law generally. The courts seemed ready to
follow the lead of the "Big Four" pollution cases1 02 and lessen the
plaintiffs burden of proof for causation. Unlike the "Big Four," however,
settlements precluded any definitive judicial opinions in three out of four
cases. In turn, those settlements demonstrate that mediation or other ADR
mechanisms may be more attractive than litigation because innovative,
substantial compensation packages allow plaintiffs to circumvent the
limited damages available through the court system, avoid incurring the
costly attorney fees noted earlier, and receive compensation more quickly.
94 Kitagawa (1989), supra note 39, § 4.04[2].
95 Kitagawa (1989), supra note 39, § 4.04[2].
96 Kitagawa (1989), supra note 39, § 4.04[2].
97 Kitagawa (1989), supra note 39, § 4.04[2].
98 The acronym stands for Subacute Myelo-Optic Neuropathy. Fujita, supra note 1, at 52. The cases
include Yagi v. State, 879 HANREi JIHO 26 (Kanazawa Dist. Ct., Mar. 1, 1978); Oyama v. State, 899
HANREI JIHO 48 (Tokyo Dist. Ct., Aug. 3, 1978); Ochi v. State, 910 HANREI JIHO 33 (Fukuoka Dist. Ct.,
Nov. 14 1978); and Aoyama v. State, 910 HANREI JiHO 19 (Hiroshima Dist. Ct., Feb. 22, 1979), cited in
Fujita, supra note 1, at 83 n.73.
99 Fujita, supra note 1, at 52.
100 Fujita, supra note 1, at 53.
101 Fujita, supra note I, at 53. Under the agreement, individuals received sliding-scale damages in
proportion to the severity of their injury; existence of SMON-linked injury was established by a court-
appointed expert panel.
102 See discussion of the "Big Four," supra note 80.
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D. Legislative and Administrative Response to Mass-Tort and Products
Liability Litigation
Scholars theorize that one role of litigation in Japan is to signal to the
government and ruling elite a shift in the social paradigm. 103 The mass-tort
and products liability litigation signaled such a shift and the subsequent
legislative and administrative responses demonstrate that the signal was
received. 104 For instance, the SMON settlement negotiations led to the
statutory establishment of the Law Concerning the Relief for Drug Side
Effect Injury, 05 which provides for the ongoing medical expenses of
SMON victims and compensates others injured by pharmaceuticals. 106
Although the individual plaintiffs in these single-injury cases
probably were not motivated by a social agenda, the aggregate effect of the
many cases involving defective appliances107 led to the passage of the 1973
Consumer Daily Life Appliances Safety Law. 108 The 1973 Safety Law
encourages manufacturers to submit their products for testing in order to
qualify for liability insurance, and if their products meet testing require-
ments, they may attach the "S.G." (Safety Goods) label.' 09 The Law not
only sets safety standards, but also provides compensation for those injured
by products which meet those standards.110
103 UPHAm, supra note 6, at 216; Matsumoto. supra note 30, at 581; Shigeaki Tanaka, Justice,
Accidents, and Compensation, 15 U. HAW. L. REv. 736, 737 (1993). But see Tanaka, supra note 103. at
739 ("Lt]he primary aim ofajudicial remedy is the realization of individualized corrective justice.").
104 The outcomes of the "Big Four" were codified in the 1973 Law for the Compensation of
Pollution-Related Health Damage ("Compensation Law"), as well as the Clean Air Act and the Clean
Water Act; see Gresser, supra note 80, at 147; Akio Morishima, The Japan Scene and the Present Products
Liability Proposal, 15 U. HAW. L. REv. 717, 723 (1993). For example, as in the Yokkaichi case, the
Compensation Law imposes strict liability on polluters for injuries caused by their pollution. Polluters are
required to pay a pollution levy which goes into a fund that is used to compensate victims, provided that
those victims meet certain criteria; see Gresser, supra note 80, at 147.
105 Fujita, supra note I, at 32 (citing to lyakuhin fukusayo higai kyZsai kikin hJ, Law No. 55,
1979).
106 Fujita, supra note 1, at 56; Yutaka Tejima, Tort and Compensation in Japan: Medical
Malpractice and Adverse Effects from Pharmaceuticals, 15 U. HAW. L. REv. 728, 732, 735 (1993).
Recently, the Act was read broadly in order to compensate hemophiliacs infected by the HIV virus through
tainted blood products.
107 Eleven of the twenty-one single-injury cases reported by Arita involved defective propane water
heaters, containers, or pipes. ARITA, supra note 56, at v-viii.
108 Fujita, supra note I, at 30, 31 (citing Sh5hi seikatsuyJ seihin anzen h. Law No. 31, (1973)).
109 Kitagawa (1989), supra note 39, § 4.08[2]; Hamada et al., supra note 21, at 87. Neither author
indicates how consumers respond to the SG label. However, it seems reasonable to assume that Japanese
consumers respond much as consumers in the United States respond to the "Underwriters Laboratory"
(UL) labels on many appliances which is to say, not at all, or at least not until a problem arises.
110 Kitagawa (1989), supra note 39, § 4.08[2].
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The local consumer centers and the Japan Consumer Information
Center are yet additional administrative responses to products liability
suits.III These centers serve as clearinghouses for consumers with
complaints about defective products, providing consultation, research, and
occasional mediation services. 112 The centers may make recommendations
to manufacturers, secure replacement products for consumers, and issue
warnings.113
In addition, there is an entire patchwork of statutory remedies that
address specific products, materials, and industries. 1 4 While it is unclear
whether litigation inspired each of these remedies, there is little question
that their net effect is to remove such issues or disputes from the judicial
arena, and place them instead under informal administrative control." 15
Though this patchwork of remedies and institutions may have sufficed for
most parties, 116 legal tort liability remained predicated on negligence. In
this respect, Japan's products liability law was out of step with consumer
protection schemes in other nations. Thus scholars, legislators, and
bureaucrats began the arduous process of revising Japan's products liability
law.
111 Shjhi Seikatsu Centers and Kokumin Seikatsu Center, respectively. Hamada et al., supra note
21, at 84.
112 Kitagawa (1989), sitpra note 39, § 4.09[l],[2].
113 Hamada et al., supra note 21, at 87; Kitagawa (1989), supra note 39, § 4.09[1l],[2].
114 These include but are not limited to the following: Consumer Protection Basic Law, Foodstuffs
Sanitation Law, Agricultural Chemical Control Law, Pharmaceutical Affairs Law, Poisonous and Harmful
Substances Control Law, Consumer Products Safety Law, Harmful Substances Used in Household
Products Control Law, Electrical Appliance and Materials Control Law, Electric Utility Industry Law, Gas
Enterprises Law, High Pressure Gas Control Law, Explosives Control Law, and Heat Supply Business
Law, among others. ARITA, supra note 56, at 26-27. Morishima notes that compensation legislation is
"formulated in reaction to the public needs of the time." Morishima, supra note 104, at 726.
115 One scholar comments that "[i]f one of the goals is to keep administrative costs down, the
Japanese system certainly is successful ... [i]f a goal is to keep the development of safety standards in
administrative hands and out of the reach of the courts and plaintiffs' attorneys, the system generally works
very well indeed." Leflar, supra note 37, at 756.
116 Whether or not the Japanese products liability regime suffices, or ought to suffice, is open to
question. See, e.g., Ramseyer & Nakazato, supra note 37, at 290 ("Litigation is scarce in Japan not
because the system is bankrupt. It is scarce because the system works."). But see Morishima, supra note
104, at 727 ("[t]he public cries out for more compensation"); see also Tejima, supra note 106, at 735
("[t]he Japanese victim.., is confronting many problems in getting relief.").
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E. The 1975 Draft Model Law on Product Liability
Reform efforts began with the 1975 Draft Model Law on Product
Liability.1 7 The 1975 Draft Law contemplated a near-total overhaul of the
regime in that it would have imposed strict liability on producers of
defective products."i8  Article 2 redefined important terms, such as
producer, product, and defect. 119 Article 3 specified that producers would
be liable without fault.120 Article 5 not only inferred the existence of
defects from injuries arising out of otherwise normal and ordinary use of
products, it also inferred time-of-production defects from later-detected
defects in injury-causing products.121 Article 10 extended liability beyond
manufacturers to sellers and distributors, and placed the burden of proof on
them to demonstrate that they were not responsible for defects. Articles 12
through 14 set out a mandatory compensation scheme to which producers
would be required to contribute.122
The 1975 Draft Law contemplated substantial procedural overhauls
as well. It proposed introducing broad powers of compulsory discovery, the
creation of a class-action type suit, and procedures for relieving relatively
small or low-cost injuries.123 These last provisions were perceived as
radical at the time the 1975 Draft Law was published and still seem so
radical that "there is little if any prospect that these proposals will become
law in the foreseeable future."124 Not all of the 1975 Draft Law provisions
were so radical, however. In fact, some were defacto incorporated into the
jurisprudence early on.' 2 5 Moreover, the 1975 Draft Law's requirement that
producers contribute to a compensation fund was not so much a break from
past practice as it was a codification or consolidation of previous case
117 The 1975 Draft Model Law on Product Liability, Aug. 28, 1975 [hereinafter 1975 Draft Law],
translated in Fujita, supra note 1, app.
118 See 1975 Draft Law, art. Ill.
119 Fujita, supra note 1, at 88-89. A more detailed analysis of the 1975 Draft Law's definition may
be found infra Part III which compares the Draft Law's definition with those of the 1994 Products Liability
Act and the 1985 EC Directive.
120 Fujita, supra note 1. The 1975 Draft Law thus contemplated strict liability for manufacturers.
121 Fujita, supra note 1.
122 Fujita, supra note I, at 91-92.
123 Fujita, supranote 1, at 92.
124 Fujita, supra note 1, at 72. But see Matsumoto, supra note 30, at 581 (noting that the Ministry
of Justice recently began to overhaul the Code of Civil Procedure).
125 For instance, the "Big Four" advanced the liberalization of causality requirements. Kitagawa
(1989), supra note 39, § 4.05[5].
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verdicts and settlements, 126 merely extending those decisions beyond their
facts.
The 1975 Draft Law's fate is unclear. 127 While some authors 28 have
implied that the judicial expansion of article 709 and the enactment of
consumer-friendly legislation incorporated the 1975 Draft Law's important
features, others offered a pessimistic explanation for its fate. One author
wrote that support for the 1975 Draft Law dwindled after its potential
negative effects were demonstrated by a series of products liability cases
handed down subsequent to its publication. 129 Whether because of positive
changes to jurisprudence, or a negative change in societal attitudes, it seems
probable that in the late 1970s and early 1980s there was no political
consensus or consumer pressure to revise Japan's products liability law.
F. The 1985 EC Directive and Subsequent Products Liability Reform
Proposals
The European Community's adoption of Council Directive 85/374
rekindled Japanese interest in revising the products liability law.130 It
appeared that a wave of strict liability legislation was sweeping over
European, Pacific Rim, and Asian nations alike. 13 1 In the eighteen month
period between February 1990 and October 1991, the Komeit3,132 the
Private Law Society's Research Group, the Federation of Japanese Bar
Associations, the Tokyo Lawyer's Association, and the Socialist Party
Special Committee on Products Liability all published proposals for
126 Kitagawa (1989), supra note 39, § 4.05[5].
127 No English-language materials offer any explicit commentary on the demise of the 1975 Draft
Law. Cf Ottley & Ottley, supra note 24, at 56; Fujita, supra note 1, at 72; Kitagawa (1989), supra note 39,
§ 4.10L.
§. j' See, e.g., Fujita, supra note 1, at 72, 74; Kitagawa (1989), supra note 39, § 4.10[1].
129 Yukihiro Asami, Sangy6kai wa katakuna na taido o aratameru beki da [The Industrial
Community Should Revise Its Stubborn Attitude], ECONOMtSUTO, Dec. 17, 1991, at 18, 19. Literally, "a
rash of products liability litigation, including the SMON cases and the Kanemiyu shd cases, tentatively
indicated the future course of such a solution and thus caused the opportunities for that legislation
gradually to wither away."
130 Id. at 19. Literally "with the EC directive acting as the catalyst, social concern for products
liabilit has risen again, in Japan as well." The EC Directive is described in detail infra Part Ill.
131 Asami writes that "not only the EC nations, but the European Free Trade Agreement nations,
Brazil, the U.S.S.R., Australia, the People's Republic of China, and the Republic of Korea have enacted
products liability law based on no-fault liability or are investigating such legislation." Id.
132 Kameit6 is the "Clean Government Party" of Japan, at the time a minority party in the Diet.
See, e.g., Karl Schoenberger, Recruit Scandal Jolts Japan Opposition, L.A. TIMES, May 18, 1989, at 14.
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products liability legislation.133 The proposal put forth by the Federation of
Japanese Bar Association was perhaps the most radical. Like the 1975
Draft Law, it would have imposed both compulsory discovery in products
liability suits and fines for manufacturers of poor quality goods. 134 Many of
the proposals would have abolished altogether the state-of-the-art defense,
and lowered plaintiffs burden of proving the causal link between defect and
injury.135
Initially, the government concluded only that there was a need for
national consensus on the actual state of affairs in Japan 136 and that there
should be sufficient investigation into products liability systems as a means
of dispute settlement.137 Still, an Economic Planning Agency survey of the
manufacturing, construction, sales, and service industries showed that
members unhappily saw reformed liability legislation as a "trend of the
times." 138 Industry observers also reported rising supply-side support for
standardized damages as a means of safeguarding research and
development.139
Yet, others supported a new products liability statute as a means of
harmonizing trade conditions between Japan and the EC nations and also as
a means of providing quality control over the growing tide of foreign goods
entering Japan as trade barriers fell.' 4 0 Still others pointed to L-tryptophan
injuries 14' as an example of cases wherein foreign and domestic consumers
133 Asami, supra note 129, at 19.
134 Asami, supra note 129, at 19.
135 Literally, "they [the legislative proposals] have in common a strong consciousness of the need
for protection of injured parties, visible in measures such as the recognition of liability for time-of-
production defect undetectable by scientific standards (denial of the so-called "danger of development
defense" [state-of-the-art defense]), a reduction of the injured party's burden of proof for demonstrating the
connection between defects and injury, and so forth." Asami, supra note 129, at 19.
136 Asami, supra note 129, at 19-20.
137 Asami, supra note 129, at 20.
138 The survey reported that 58% of those questioned had- "resigned themselves" to new products
liability legislation (the number rises to 60% and 67% respectively when limited to the manufacturing and
construction industries). Sixty-one percent indicated that they were researching the impact of products
liability on their industry. Shiry6: PL h6 seitei wa jidal no nagare ka [Data: Is Enactment of a Products
Liability Law the Trend of the Times?], ECONOMISUTO, Dec. 17, 1991, at 30, 31 (Economic Planning
Agency survey of various industrial sectors throughout Japan) [hereinafter EPA Survey]. The survey does
not report its margin of error, nor does it break down respondents by firm or firm size.
139 See. e.g., Sumihiko Shigeno, PL hoken no mondaiten wa nani ka [What Are the Problems in
Products Liability Insurance?], ECONOMISUTO, Dec. 17, 1991, at 28 (Literally, "industry is urging the
necessity of standardizing damage payment costs in order to prevent research and development from
slowing."). Others worried that strict liability would engender "an excessive pursuit of quality control."
EPA Survey, supra note 138, at 31 (60% of respondents so indicated).
140 See. e.g., Morishima, supra note 104, at 725.
141 See, e.g., Matsumoto, supra note 30, at 580. Matsumoto does not provide a specific citation.
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injured by Japanese-manufactured products received disparate compensa-
tion. 142 Such cases lent credence to demands that Japan's law had to be
overhauled in order for justice to prevail143 and to address the "drastic
changes" in the balance of consumer and industry power. 144 Eventually, a
series of legislative proposals145 culminated in the July 1, 1994 Products
Liability Act.
III. JAPAN'S 1994 PRODUCTS LIABILITY ACT: AN ALL-NEW PRODUCT OR
JUST A NEW PACKAGE?
An analysis of the July 1, 1994 Products Liability Act requires
analysis not only of the Act itself, but also comparison with the sources
which inspired and informed the Act. Those sources include the 1985 EC
Directive, 146 the 1975 Draft Model'Law on Product Liability, and the earlier
Japanese products liability regime.1
47
A. Article I (Purpose)
The Act's stated purpose is to contribute to the stability and
improvement of the national livelihood, the sound development of the
national economy, and the protection of injured persons by stipulating the
142 In fiscal year 1991, Sh6wa Denk6 (the manufacturer of a contaminated amino acid supplement)
paid US$66,000,000 in settlements to injured U.S. consumers, and US$100,000,000 in litigation and
settlement costs after facing more than 1,000 lawsuits involving over 1,500 victims. In Japan, Showa faced
the threat of one suit---though the plaintiff's attomey admitted a lack of proper evidence which could be
admitted in a Japanese court. Matsumoto, supra note 30, at 580.
143 "Aren't ... Japan's enterprises coping with products liability laws in foreign countries? Aren't
they selling the same products in Japan, Europe, and America, and compensating European and American
consumers where accidents have occurred? Japanese consumers are bearing an injustice, since the same
rights are not given in Japan." Masato Nakamura, SeiztSbutsu ni yoru higai a dJ kyfisai suru no ka [How
Should Product-Related Injuries Be Compensated?], EcONoMISUTo, Dec. 17, 1991, at 22, 25.
144 "In these times when the balance of consumer and industry power has undergone drastic
changes, a law that will guarantee equality between these groups is a necessity." Kazuko Miyamoto,
Seiz6butsu ni yoru higai a d kyasai suru no ka? [How Should Product-Related Injuries Be
Compensated?], ECONOMISUTO, Dec. 17, 1991, at 22, 27.
145 Danaher, supra note 1, at 25 (citing three semi-official advisory reports).
146 EC Directive 85/374, reprinted in Marc S. Klein, Megatrends in International Product Liability
Law, C949 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 113, 118 (1994), available in WESTLAW, Products Liability-Law Reviews,
Texts & Bar Journals Database (PL-TP). The 1985 EC directive itself is somewhat reminiscent of
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A.
147 The earlier products liability regime is comprised of the relevant Civil Code articles, the judicial
gloss on those articles as developed in the cases, and the legislation and administrative agencies created in
response to that judicial gloss. See supra Part II discussing the Earlier Products Liability Regime.
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liability of "producers, or the like" for damages arising to a person's life,
body or property caused by defective products.148 The drafters of the Act
clearly were concerned with its impact on national economic matters; two
out of four clauses address the need to protect the economy, leaving the last
two for consumer protection. 149 By comparison, the EC Directive's lengthy
preamblelS0 makes but a single reference to economic matters, and any
number of references to protecting consumers. 15 1
Article 1 of the 1975 Draft Law provides a more dramatic compari-
son. Its stated purpose was to "promote the protection of consumers
through the establishment of liability for payment of compensation for
injury caused by defects in manufactured goods and the provision of
measures to secure the performance thereof."1 52 The 1975 Draft Law
voiced no economic concerns that might infringe, limit, or otherwise color
an injured consumer's right to recover for injuries caused by defective
products. While preambles or statements of purpose admittedly are not
binding statements of law, they may be considered statements of legislative
intent. Courts may refer to them in close cases to construe properly the
meaning of statutes. It appears that the drafters of the new Act intended the
courts to strike an entirely different sort of balance from that envisioned by
the drafters of the EC Directive or the 1975 Draft Law. This is not
surprising, given that the overhaul comes during a protracted recession1 53
and that the Government's reaction to the initial call for change was
lukewarm at best. 154
148 See PLA, art. 1, translated in KITAGAWA, supra note 3.
149 The Act is silent on what constitutes the "national livelihood" and its stability or improvement,
thus leaving the door open for judicial interpretation. PLA, art. i, translated in KITAGAWA, supra note 3.
The phrase in question is kokumin seikatsu no antei kjjd. Kitagawa translates seikatsu as "livelihood,"
carrying with it an economic emphasis: the sense of earning one's daily bread, or one's standard of living.
KITAGAWA, supra note 3, app. 4D-1. See also SANSEIDO'S NEW CONCISE JAPANESE-ENGLISH DICTIONARY
788 (2d ed., 1985).
150 This appellation is used for lack of any better title by which to describe the three-and-a-half
page introduction to the Directive. See EC Directive 85/374, Klein, supra note 146, at 126.
151 Klein, supra note 146, at 126-28.
152 Fujita, supra note 1, at 88.
153 Danaher, supra note 1, at 29.
154 Cf Asami, supra note 129, at 19-20.
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B. Article 2 (Definitions)
Article 2 defines three key terms: product, defect, and producer. 1
55
Products are broadly defined as produced or processed movables. 156
Defects are defined as a product lacking the safety it should normally have,
taking into account its characteristics, the normally anticipated method of
use, the time of its delivery by "producers, or the like," and any other
circumstances relating to the product.' 57 The definition of "producers, or
the like" includes manufacturers, processors, importers, and anyone holding
themselves out as a producer by placing their name, tradename, trademark,
or other representation on the product in question.158 The definition also
includes anyone making a representation which is misleading as to the
identity of the actual producer or which identifies the representor as the
producer, taking into account "other circumstances" including the means of
production, processing, importing or distribution.15 9
The Act's definition of "product" is broader than the EC Directive's
definition 60 but narrower than the 1975 Draft Law's definition.'61 The Act
does not follow the Directive in disallowing liability for damage caused by
"primary agricultural products,"'162 which include the products of fisheries,
soil, and stock farming that have not undergone "initial processing"-an
additional term, left undefined.163 If the Act disallowed such products, it
might well prohibit the courts from hearing new cases arising from the
mishandling of rawfugu (blowfish) in restaurants, 164 or cases arising from
the erroneous prescription of traditional folk remedies relying on unproc-
essed animal, vegetable, or mineral materials.165 The Act's definition of
"product" thus preserves several causes of action historically utilized by
155 KITAGAWA, supra note 3, app. 4D- I.
156 KITAGAWA, supra note 3, app. 4D-1.
157 KITAGAWA, supra note 3, app. 4D-1.
158 KITAGAWA, supra note 3. app. 4D-1.
159 KITAGAWA, supra note 3, app. 4D- I.
160 Klein, supranote 146, at 128.
161 Fujita, supra note 1,at88.
162 Klein supra note 146, at 128.
163 Klein supra note 146, at 128. The Directive's definition of "product" and failure to define
"initial processing" would create justiciable questions whether raw fugu (blowfish) sliced and served in a
restaurant, see ARITA, supra note 56, at 39-40, and adonis root sold for medicinal tea-brewing purposes,
see ARITA, supra note 56, at 47-48, did or did not undergo "initial processing" that might create liability.
The Act's construction moots the issue.
164 See, e.g., Adachi v. Shoga, 704 HANREI JIHO 80, (Kobe Dist. Ct, Dec. 21, 1972), noted in
Kitagawa (1989), supra note 39, § 4.05[8]; ARITA, supra note 56, at 47-48.
165 See ARITA, supra note 56, at 47-48.
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plaintiffs in single-injury cases. 166 The Act does not reach as far as article
two of the 1975 Draft Law, which defined product as "anything which
enters the distribution process ... without regard to whether an item is a
product of nature."
167
It is difficult to compare the Act with the relevant Civil Code articles
and prior judicial decisions because those sources did not explicitly define
the term "product."' 168 It appears that the courts subsumed the product-or-
not-product inquiry within the wider inquiry into whether there was a duty
and a breach of that duty. 169 Now, it appears that some cases formerly
classified as products liability cases under the negligence regime will be
reclassified as negligence cases under the new strict liability regime because
they lack a "product" as defined by the Act. 170 Plaintiffs in such cases may
be denied the strict liability protections imposed by the Act,171 but the
166 See ARITA, supra note 56, at 39-40, 47-48.
167 The Draft law, much like the EC Directive, provided that, in the alternative, products of nature
might be excluded if unprocessed in any way. Fujita, supra note 1, at 88.
168 Fujita, supra note 1, at 14 ("The question asked here is simply whether the particular defendant
can be said to have violated the plaintiff's right negligently"). But see Kitagawa (1989), supra note 39, §
4.02[2] ("[tihe product must be such that its kind, standards, structure, raw materials, manufacturing
process, and quality are unilaterally determined by its manufacturer"), citing Dai-Tokyo Fudosan v. Kanto
Kogyo K.K., 330 HANREi TAIMUZU 287, (Tokyo High Ct., June 30, 1975).
169 See. e.g., ARITA, supra note 56, at 39-40, 47-48 (citing two cases: one decreeing a restaurant
liable for poisoning caused by raw fish, and the other decreeing an apothecary liable for poisoning caused
by ingestion of root prescribed as folk remedy). One might theorize that the courts never confronted
directly the question of what constituted a "product" because the small universe of products liability cases
involved items obviously manufactured or processed and thus "products" within any meaningful definition
of that term. See, e.g., Cohen & Martin, supra note 38, at 327 ("Since major products liability cases are
exceedingly rare, the Japanese court has simply not had the opportunity to consider the problem over a
wide variety of situations"). Yet, this theory is contrasted by the record. Arita documented products
liability cases involving items ranging from foodstuffs to pharmaceuticals to vehicles to toys to brake-
repair jobs. ARITA, supra note 56, at v-viii. Kitagawa notes that a court considered, and rejected, the
notion of an unfinished building as a "product." Kitagawa (1989), supra note 39, § 4.02[2].
170 For example, Kitagawa and Arita cite as products liability cases two incidents of defective
repairs to automobile brakes. Kitagawa (1989), supra note 39, § 4.05[4] n.18; ARITA, supra note 56, at 24-
25. In one case, the owners of the car and the garage that repaired the car were held liable for damages
caused when the brakes failed as the owners drove the car home from the garage. There was no evidence
that a faulty part was to blame; instead, proper parts were improperly adjusted or installed. ARITA, supra
note 56, at 24-25. It is unlikely that a court could stretch the Act's definition of"product" to encompass an
overhauled automobile brake system composed of proper parts and improper adjustments or installation,
because the improper service component (which sounds in negligence or contract) is simply too significant.
Absent a defective product, the Act does not apply, and the plaintiffwould be left with a cause of action for
breach of contract or negligence under Civil Code articles 415 or 709, or both. For further discussion, see
analysis of article 3 infra Part IV.C. Interestingly, an improperly adjusted automobile brake system might
well have constituted a "product" under the 1975 Draft law definition, since the brake system could be
classified as an item that enters the distribution system. See Fujita, supra note 1, at 88.
171 While article 6 of the Act incorporates by reference the Civil Code articles (and presumably the
relevant case law as well, see infra Part IV.F), it remains to be seen whether the courts will continue to
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majority of mainstream products liability cases should be little affected by
the Act's broad definition of product.
It appears also that the Act's definition of "defect"'172 will have little
impact on most cases. Here, the Act follows closely the contours of both
the EC Directive's definition 73 and the 1975 Draft Law's definition. 174 In
following these definitions, the Act takes a step away from true strict
liability. By including elements such as "the normally anticipated method
of use,"'175 the Act admits considerations of comparative negligence and
foreseeability, which in turn allow the courts to apportion fault to a plaintiff
who uses the product in an unforeseeable manner, or who incorrectly
installs or misuses a product. Such apportionment, however, follows the
courts' past practice. 176
A significant change may lie in the Act's definition of "producer."' 177
The Act casts a wide net that appears to ensnare any and all persons associ-
ated with the relevant product, except retailers. By excluding retailers from
liability, the Act resembles not only the EC Directive 178 and the 1975 Draft
Law, but also recent U.S. legislation. 179 All of these approaches allow an
impose a strict duty of care in negligence now that the negligence doctrine does not of necessity serve a
second, near-strict liability function.
172 The Japanese term is kekkan, denoting a defect, fault, or shortcoming. SANSEIDO'S NEW
CONCISE JAPANESE-ENGLISH DICTIONARY 446 (1985). Earlier advisory council reports were divided on
whether to define "defect" or to leave it to the courts. Danaher, supra note 1, at 28.
173 The Directive defines a defective product as one which "does not provide the safety which a
person is entitled to expect, taking all circumstances into account, including: (a) the presentation of the
product; (b) the use to which it could reasonably be expected that the product would be put: (c) the time
when the product was put into circulation." Klein, supra note 146, at 128.
174 The 1975 Draft law defined "defect" as "any flaw in a product which causes an inordinate
danger to life, to the person, or to property during ordinarily foreseeable use." Fujita, supra note 1, at 88.
However, the phrase "inordinate danger to life" would have granted the judiciary an enormous amount of
discretion.
175 KITAGAWA, supra note 3, app. 4D-I. The Japanese translation is tsajd yoken sareru shiy6
keitai.
176 See, e.g., Kitagawa (1989), supra note 39, § 4.05[81 n.37 (citing five cases where courts
apportioned fault or negligence between defendants and plaintiffs, with ratios ranging from 50/50 to
70/30); see also ARITA, supra note 56, at 68-74 (citing seven cases featuring fault or negligence
apportionment; some cases overlap with Kitagawa).
177 KITAGAWA, supra note 3, app. 4D-1. The Japanese translation is seiz6 gydsha nado (literally,
"manufacturer[s] and so forth").
178 The EC Directive does allow the injured person to treat each supplier of the product as the
producer unless or until the supplier informs the injured person of the producer's identity within a
reasonable time. Klein, supra note 146, at 128. However, this is clearly a means to compel disclosure or
discovery of the actual producer (who presumably would be named to the suit in place of the supplier)
rather than a means of settling a supplier's liability. Klein, supra note 146, at 128.
179 See, e.g. Common Sense Legal Reforms Act of 1995 § 103(a)(B), available in LEXIS, LEGIS
Library, BILLS File; see also WASH. REV. CODE § 7.72.010 (1995) et seq. Both statutes limit a product
seller's liability to cases where a manufacturer is unavailable. Historically, products sellers have been held
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injured consumer to bring suit against manufacturers, component manufac-
turers, processors, importers, and "private labelers" who put their
tradename, trademark, or other identifier on a product actually
manufactured by another. 8 0 Yet, such definitions do not include resellers
or retailers, and in this respect the Act represents a shift away from prior
practice, wherein an injured consumer had recourse first and foremost
against the seller.' 8' Currently, it is possible for sellers to be entirely
excluded from the liability scheme. 182
Theoretically, it should be possible to attack sellers under a very
expansive reading of the Act's "or the like" residuary clause, but such a
reading would tend to contravene the apparent legislative intent to focus
liability on actual or putative producers. Removing sellers from the liability
scheme may reduce an injured person's access to previously available
defendants, but this reduction should not be felt too strongly given the
enormous class of defendants encompassed within the Act's broad
sweep. 18 3
C. Article 3 (Products Liability)
Article 3 stipulates a producer's liability for injuries caused by a
defective product. Where a defective product (produced, processed, or
imported by a producer or representor or the like under article 2) causes
death or injury to a person, or damage to property other than the product
itself, the producer (or the like) is liable to compensate for such damage.18 4
In this regard the Act resembles the 1975 Draft Law 8 5 and the EC
liable for injuries caused by defective products whether or not a manufacturer was available to defend.
See. e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965), cited in HENDERSON ET AL., THE TORTS
PROCESS 576 (James A. Henderson, et al. eds., 4th ed. 1994).
180 See Klein, supra note 146, at 128; Fujita, supra note 1, at 88.
181 See discussion of article 415, supra Part Ill.
182 Given that the courts widely permitted sellers to subrogate their liability as against a
manufacturer, the new Act may in fact merely remove that intermediate procedural step in the process of
establishing a manufacturer's liability. See discussion of article 415, supra Part 111.
183 Again, article 6 preserves the relevant Civil Code articles, so an injured person ought to be able
to sue a seller in negligence or breach of contract. See discussion, infra Part lV.C. Though, this option
seems rather unattractive, as the typical Japanese retail outlet-a "mom and pop" operation-lacks
anything resembling deep pockets. See, e.g., Hugh T. Patrick & Thomas P. Rohlen, Small-Scale Family
Enterprises, in I THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF JAPAN-THE DOMESTIC SCENE 331, 350 (Kozo Yamamura
& Yasukichi Yasuba eds., 1987).
184 See KITAGAWA, supra note 3, app. 4D-1.
185 Article 3 of the 1975 Draft Law reads: "[t]he producer shall be responsible to compensate any
natural person for injury to life, to the person, or to property incurred as a result of a defect in a product."
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Directive, 186 both of which also stipulate the liability of a broad class
deemed "producers" under the law. In the Act's case, however, the stipula-
tion is but a nominal advancement over previous law because the courts
previously developed defacto, if not dejure, strict liability for producers. 8 7
In this respect, the Act does not effect a material change over the previous
products liability regime, but instead codifies the spirit of the previous
regime.
However, the Act differs materially from both the EC Directive and
the 1975 Draft Law because it does not explicitly address the burden of
proving the existence of a defect, an injury, or a causal link between the
two.1 88 Absent such a provision, the Act appears to accept the old regime's
allocation of the burden of proof.'8 9 The old regime required that the
plaintiff meet "a crushing burden of proof."' 190 The plaintiff must prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that an injury occurred, that a defect exists, a
causal link between the defect and the injury, 191 and the fault of the manu-
Fujita, supra note 1, at 89. Like article 2 of the Act, article 2 of the 1975 Draft Law stipulates that
importers, processors, component manufacturers, and private labelers shall be liable as producers. Fujita,
supra note 1, at 88.
186 Article I of the Directive reads: "[t]he producer shall be liable for damage caused by a defect in
his product." See Klein, supra note 146, at 128. Like article 2 of the Act, article 3 of the Directive
stipulates that importers, processors, component manufacturers, and private labelers shall be liable as
producers. See Klein, supra note 146, at 128.
187 Adachi et al., supra note 63; Kitagawa (1989), supra note 39, § 4.05[5]; Fujita, supra note 1, at
71.
188 Article 4 of the EC Directive stipulates that the plaintiff must prove the existence of a defect,
injury, and a causal relationship. See Klein, supra note 146, at 128-129. In contrast, articles 4 through 6 of
the 1975 Draft Law stipulated that under certain circumstances, the existence of a defect, and a causal
relationship between the defect and the injury, shall be inferred. Fujita, supra note 1, at 89. Thus, under
the 1975 Draft Law, plaintiff's burden of proof might have ended with proof of injury. Article 5 of the
1975 Draft Law further stipulated that ifa product had been in service for some time, and a defect in that
product was found contemporaneous with an injury resulting from use of the product, the defect would be
deemed to have existed at the time the product was delivered. Fujita, supra note 1, at 89. Thus, articles 4
through 6 not only suggested a marked departure from actual practice, but ameliorated the lack of
discovery mechanisms as well, making the courts a more viable tool for redress in single-injury cases.
189 Again, article 6's incorporation of the Civil Code articles (and therefore the courts'
interpretation of those articles) signals that the courts' previous distribution of the burden of proof may
continue in force. See discussion of article 6 infra Par IV.F.
190 Fujita, supra note 1, at 
14.
191 Kitagawa (1989), supra note 39, § 4.05[5]. Courts appear to honor this rule in the breach,
however. The judiciary unofficially revised this requirement beginning with the "Big Four" pollution suits.
See Gresser, supra note 80. These cases introduced the plaintiff-friendly concepts of epidemiological or
probability-based causation. Kitagawa (1989), supra note 39, § 4.05[5]. However, the theories do not
always receive a warm judicial welcome. See, e.g., Kitagawa (1989), supra note 39, § 4.05[5] n.22.
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facturer or distributor in making or marketing the product. 192 In certain
cases, plaintiffs burden was reduced because the courts imposed a strict
duty of care upon certain limited classes of defendants. 193 Under the
"special negligence" 194 rule, "[p]roof of the existence of a defect per se goes
a long way toward demonstrating that this duty of care has been breached
and that the defendant is at fault."'1 95 Still, it is difficult to meet even this
reduced burden of proof. 196 As the Act does not incorporate any explicit
discovery rules or mechanisms, it incorporates in toto the discovery rules
and mechanisms set forth in the Civil Code and the Rules of Civil
Procedure. 1
97
Although Japan's Rules of Civil Procedure provide that parties
should ensure sufficient pretrial investigation, 198 there are no devices to
compel oral examination of an uncooperative witness or person 99 and no
written interrogatories or requests for admission. 200  Production of
documents and other evidence is highly restricted, dependent on substantive
law, and not terribly useful unless a party already has detailed information
about the desired items.20 1 These discovery limitations have a well-docu-
mented chilling effect on potential litigation.202 The effect adheres even
192 Fujita, supra note 1, at 13. Because no contractual relationship exists to create a duty on the
part of the manufacturer or distributor towards the plaintiff, the plaintiff must show that the relevant party's
intentional or negligent actions could produce injury in question.
193 Kitagawa (1989), supra note 39, § 4.05[4]. Large-scale producers or distributors of foodstuffs,
pharmaceuticals, and similar items were primarily subject to this higher duty of care. Kitagawa (1989),
supra note 39 § 4.05[4]. The courts early imposed defacto, if not dejure strict liability on polluters as
well. Gresser, supra note 80, at 146. But, as Gresser notes, the subsequent enactment of the pollution law
denied the courts any further opportunity to expand or interpret their holding in the Yokkaichi case.
Gresser, supra note 80, at 146.
Other defendant classes, such as physicians employed by large well-equipped hospitals, were
held to higher standards as well. Kitagawa (1989), supra note 39, § 4.05[4] n.17. Even so, the plaintiff's
burden remained high by American standards. Matsumoto, supra note 30, at 579.
194 The phrase is Kitagawa's. Kitagawa (1989), supra note 39, § 4.05[4].
195 Fujita, supra note 1, at 13.
196 Matsumoto, supra note 30, at 579.
197 See analysis of article 6 infra Part Iv.F.
198 Yamanouchi & Cohen, supra note 23, at 444 n.6 (citing T. HATTORI & D. HENDERSON, CIVIL
PROCEDURE IN JAPAN § 6.02, at 6-3 n.5 (1985)).
199 American-style depositions are unknown in Japan. Yaranouchi & Cohen, supra note 23, at
445.
200 See Yamanouchi & Cohen, supra note 23, at 446.
201 Yamanouchi & Cohen, supra note 23 at 446-447.
202 Fujita, supra note i, at 3 (identifying the absence of formal discovery mechanisms in Japan as a
significant hurdle to plaintiffs in products liability cases); Yamanouchi & Cohen, supra note 23, at 447
(comparing Japanese and American discovery devices and finding Japanese devices less effective); Ottley
& Ottley, supra note 24, at 39, 45 (noting the lack of discovery procedures and the impact of
administrative guidance (,gytsei shido-) on discovery by minimizing evidence about corporate malfeasance);
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under the special negligence rule, wherein the plaintiff still must prove
positively the existence of a defect.203 Absent the necessary proof, the
plaintiffs case will fail.204 The Act's substantive law maintains the artifi-
cially high stakes a plaintiff is required to muster, and thus reduces the set
of plaintiffs that may bring and maintain a products liability suit. Article 3
of the Act represents a significant disappointment for those who hoped the
Act would bypass the anemic discovery mechanisms which impede single-
injury cases.205 Absent any discovery revisions,2 06 the Act's protections are
not readily accessible to persons injured by defective products. 207
Article 3, combined with article 2, also excludes from the new
products liability universe certain types of cases previously included. Such
cases, among them the defective automobile brake repair cases, 208 cannot
meet the definitional standards of the Act. There is no "product," or
Matsumoto, supra note 30, at 578-79 (lack of extensive discovery is the "principal reason" for scarcity of
products liability suits); see also Cohen & Martin. supra. note 38, at 330, 339-40 (noting the lack of a
formal discovery process). But see Ramseyer, supra note 25, at 635 n.188 (the lack of discovery may
reduce litigation costs).
203 Arita documents the use ofres ipsa loquitur theory, see ARITA, supra note 56, at 23-25; see also
Kitagawa (1989), supra note 39, § 4.05[4] n. 18 (citing separate cases in which defendant auto repair shops
failed to rebut presumption of defective repair and were held liable). Yet in two other cases, plaintiffs'
claims were denied because they failed positively to establish the existence of a defect. See ARITA, supra
note 56, at 41-43 (no recovery in cases where defects not positively shown to cause a dump truck bed to
fall, or to cause small car to weave dangerously across road at highway speeds). This is in contrast to
several of the mass-tort cases discussed below. There, the judiciary allowed proof of injury to establish a
rebuttable presumption of defect where the injury could have been caused (epidemiologically speaking) by
the alleged defect. See HAMADA ET AL., supra note 21, at 91; Fujita, supra note 1, at 15; Cohen & Martin,
supra note 38, at 331; Kitagawa (1989), supra note 39, § 4.05[5] n. 20. In most other mass-injury tort
cases, the courts applied the "special negligence" rule for manufacturers of pharmaceuticals and food
products, rendering superfluous theories of epidemiological causation or res ipsa loquitur. See, e.g.,
Kitagawa (1989), supra note 39, § 4.05[4].
204 ARITA, supra note 56, at 41-43, 57-58; see also Fujita, supra note I, at 54.
205 An open question is whether such far-reaching revisions would be appropriate within an Act
aimed at a relatively narrow area of law, but the 1975 Draft Law contemplated exactly that. See Fujita,
supra note 1, at 89.
206 Because the discovery limitations are universal, the Civil Code articles' protections are not
readily accessible either. However, there are rumblings that Japan's century-old Civil Code will undergo a
revision in the near future. See, e.g., Matsumoto, supra note 30, at 581. Revisions of the Code itself might
cure the present discovery shortcomings.
207 The new Act does not bode well for the 52-year-old housewife injured by Showa Denko's
contaminated L-tryptophan. Matsumoto, supra note 30, at 580. Many hoped that the Act would afford
Japanese plaintiffs legal remedies similar to those available to their American counterparts. Cf Asami,
supra note 129, at 21: "One cannot say that circumstances are equitable when European or American
consumers are compensated for injuries caused by a given Japanese-made product under the no-fault
liability doctrine, and Japanese consumers are not compensated for the same injuries under the negligence
liability doctrine." Those hopes appear to be forgone.
208 See Matsumoto, supra note 30, note 172.
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"producer" even within the Act's broad definition of those terms. 209 The
distinction may be a fine one, however, as very similar cases (like airplane
crashes triggered by defectively-manufactured or defectively-repaired
steering gear)2 10 may well fit into the new universe. It is possible that the
defective auto-repair cases were not product liability cases to begin with,
but were instead ordinary negligence cases improperly labeled and miscate-
gorized; however, this seems unlikely because the defective auto-repair
cases clearly met the former "product" and "producer" tests.2 11 Therefore,
the Act appears in some small respects to restrict the products liability
universe, and narrow the courts' domain.
D. Article 4 (Exemptions)
Article 4 provides two explicit defenses to producer liability. It
exempts component manufacturers from liability if the defect in question is
traceable to improper design or improper instructions by the manufacturer.
of the product as a whole, and the component manufacturer is not at fault.2 12
It also exempts regular product manufacturers from liability if the defect in
question could not be detected given the state of the art at the time of the
product's delivery. 213 By codifying these explicit defenses, the Act strikes a
middle path between the EC Directive and the 1975 Draft Law. The 1975
209 It might be possible to consider the mechanic a "processor" within the Act's definition of that
term, see KITAGAWA, supra note 3, app. 4D-1; still, the other elements, such as causation and fault, would
be lacking.
210 See, e.g., Yabutani v. The Boeing Company, 754 HANREI JIHO 58 (Tokyo Dist. Ct., July 24,
1974). It is important to note that defectively repaired aircraft also may be a special case, because they are
commonly repaired-in many ways, remanufactured-by their producers at regular intervals. The
manufacturer thus maintains control over the product's quality over time, and may be said to retain liability
for defects in that quality. The same cannot be said for defectively repaired automobiles. Cited in
Kitagawa (1989), supra note 39, § 4.05[2].
211 Kitagawa describes the typical products liability problem as involving, among other things,
"consumer products in general-'products"' and "a manufacturer of [that product] as an injuring party."
Kitagawa (1989), supra note 39, § 4.02[2]. As a consumer product manufactured or processed by an
injuring party, a defectively repaired automobile brake system qualified as a "product" under the old test.
Furthermore, article 10, paragraph three of the 1975 Draft Law specified that "[r]epairers who cause a
defect in a product or overlook a defect that should have been discovered" would be held liable as
producers. Fujita, supra note 1, at 90. Given the advisory, prophylactic role of the Draft Law in Japan
(similar to the role of § 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts in the United States), it is likely that
repairers would have been held liable in near-strict liability under the old regime.
212 KITAGAWA, supra note 3, app. 4D-2.
213 KITAGAWA, supra note 3, app. 4D-2.
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Draft Law encompassed no such measures;2 14 the EC Directive features at
least six, two of which are nearly identical to those incorporated into the
Act.
2 15
Previous Japanese case law also recognized a state-of-the-art
defense, 2 16 though it was disliked and avoided by the courts, and thus
difficult to implement.2 17 Article 4's component-manufacturer liability
escape clause is not so readily linked to earlier cases, yet it is undoubtedly
familiar to the courts. 2 18 The Act's inclusion of these particular defenses
does not seem to constitute a dramatic break from past practice. However,
it does seem to severely undermine the Act's stated purpose of stipulating to
a producer's liability. Moreover, the inclusion of explicit defenses restricts
the "courts' earlier freedom to develop or abandon the defenses, or to adopt
the defenses in some cases (but not others) according to flexible criteria.
The Act thus removes a modicum of judicial discretion.
E. Article 5 (Limitation of Time)
Article 5 provides two statutes of limitation for products liability
sui ts. First, article 5 provides a three-year statute of limitations that runs
from the time an injured person or his or her legal representatives become
214 See generally Fujita, supra note 1, at 88-92. The 1975 Draft Law explicitly included component
manufacturers as "producers." Fujita, supra note 1, at 88 ("Producer" includes component manufacturers
"to the extent of the portion of the final product comprised of such parts.").
215 EC Directive No. 85/374, July 25, 1985, art. 7, reprinted in Klein, supra note 146, at 128, 129.
Article 7, (a)-(f) codifies six defenses; (d) and (f) resemble the defenses in Japan's new act. Several other
caveats that might serve as defenses are scattered throughout the Directive. ("A product shall not be
considered defective for the sole reason that a better product is subsequently put into circulation."). Klein,
supra note 146, at 128, 129.
216 Adachi et al., supra note 63, at 47.
217 Adachi et al., supra note 63, at 47. The courts' disapproval of this argument may be traced
back to several of the early pollution cases, where the courts specifically held that a polluter's use of "the
best technology available in any part of the world ... would not shield defendants from liability if other
protective measures also could have been employed." Gresser, supra note 80, at 146.
218 The author has located no English-language source describing either a larger policy or a specific
incident of releasing component manufacturers from liability for defects attributable to the main product
manufacturer's faulty design or specifications. However, it stands to reason that such a practice exists,
given the longstanding joint-and-several liability of all producers. See, e.g., Kitagawa (1989), supra note
39, § 4.05[6][b]; Adachi et al., supra note 63, at 45. If such a policy did not exist, Japanese component
manufacturers (mostly small to medium size family enterprises, in Japan's notorious dual economy) would
be forced out of business in droves by the cost of defending twice over: once, in the products liability
lawsuit; and again, in any subsequent suit over apportionment of liability. Cf Patrick & Rohlen, supra
note 183, at 332, 343-49; Kitagawa (1989), supra note 39, § 4.05[6]; Fujita, supra note I, at 21, 23-25 (in
light of Fujita's comments at 23, it seems likely that the Act's provisions are intended to ease such
tortfeasors in and out of cases).
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aware of compensible damage and the identity of the person liable to
compensate for such damage.2 19 Second, article 5 provides a statute of
repose that runs out ten years from the time of the product's delivery.2 20
The article further provides that in cases where damage results from an
accumulation of dangerous substances in the human body, or in cases where
damage is diagnosed after a latent period, the ten-year statute of repose runs
from the time of occurrence of such damage. 22 1
The EC Directive222 and the Civil Code articles 223 feature similar
provisions. The Act differs from the Code and the 1975 Draft Law only in
omitting an alternative twenty-year absolute statute of limitation running
from the occurrence of the injury.224 While the Act's statute of limitation
appears to be plaintiff-friendly (as it concedes an injured party's limited
powers of discovery), the elimination of the twenty-year provision means
that the Act may be somewhat less favorable to an injured party than was
the previous Code.225 Still, the Act sweeps a very broad class of persons
into the "producer" category. 226 Article 5 probably will not have a signifi-
cant negative effect for plaintiffs, as almost any plaintiff should be able to
find someone nominally liable under article 2, paragraph three within the
statutory period.227
The remainder of article 5 appears to anticipate incipient asbestos and
smoking cases. 228  This part of the article is susceptible to judicial
219 KITAGAWA, supra note 3, app. 4D-2, 4D-3. Black's Law Dictionary 1411 (6th ed. 1990)
defines a statute of repose as "one that cuts offa right of action after specified time measured from delivery
of product... regardless [of when the cause of action accrued]."
220 KITAGAWA, supra note 3, app. 4D-2, 4D-3.
221 KITAGAWA, supra note 3, app. 4D-2, 4D-3.
222 The EC Directive's article 10 provides a three-year statute of limitations running from the time
a plaintiff becomes aware or should become aware of the damage, the defect, and the producer's identity;
article 11 provides a ten-year statute of repose. See Klein, supra note 146, at 129.
223 See Adachi et al., supra note 63, at 17 (Civil Code article 724 provides a three year statute of
limitation running from the time an injured person becomes aware of the injury and the identity of the
injuring party). The 1975 Draft Law appears to have recodified the Civil Code provisions as well. See
Fujita, supra note 1, at 90. The 1975 Draft Law also provided an alternative ten-year statute of limitation
for cases of imperfect performance of obligation. Given the Act's focus in tort, and the dereliction of
contract as a products liability remedy, such a clause would be both inappropriate and ineffective.
224 See KITAGAWA, supra note 3, app. 4D-2; Adachi et al., supra note 63, at 17; Fujita, supra note
1, at 90.
225 Again, article 6 preserves the applicability of the Civil Code provisions, so the 20 year
extinctive period may still apply; whether or not this is the case remains to be seen.
226 See discussion of article 2 supra note 177.
227 See KITAGAWA, supra note 3, app.4D-2.
228 Cf Leflar, supra note 37, at 751-53. It is likely that asbestos and smoking cases "will
dramatically increase over time" due to Japan's later and longer use of asbestos and high smoking rates.
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interpretation, because the "time of occurrence of... damage" 229 is concep-
tually vague. Damage from exposure to a dangerous product (such as lung
damage from asbestos in the workplace) can occur for years before
symptoms are manifested. And symptoms may be manifested for some time
before a diagnosis of an exact cause is possible. At which time is the
"damage" said to occur? If "damage" is said to occur at the time of
exposure, the Act is hostile to injuries caused by the slow accumulation of
toxic agents and to injuries with a long latent period. If "damage" is said to
occur when symptoms are manifested, the Act is hostile to injuries whose
symptoms may be common to many sources. If "damage" is said to occur
when a causal diagnosis is possible, the Act is hostile to those plaintiffs
without access to sophisticated medical care as well as to manufacturers,
whose liability would hinge on the various medical communities' diagnostic
skills.
One solution lies in the courts' approach to the similar, if not more
complex, problems of causal determination in the early pollution cases. 230
In those case, the courts relied on epidemiological causation and statistical
probability to first lower, then shift the plaintiffs burden of proof.231 The
courts may well adopt this solution when confronted with the questions
inherent in article 5.232
F. Article 6 (Application of Civil Code)
Article 6 dictates that not only the Products Liability Act, but also the
Civil Code articles apply to the liability of a "producer or the like" for
damage caused by a defective product. 233 Although it may be anticlimactic
to state, article 6 is perhaps the single most important provision in the Act.
By reiterating the applicability of the Civil Code articles (and by
implication, the body of interpretive case law), the Act reinforces the status
quo. Together with the forgoing analysis of the other provisions, article 6
229 KITAGAWA, supra note 3, app. 4D-2, 4D-3. The ambiguity may be a creature of translation.
The Japanese is songai ga sh6jita toki kara kisan suru-literally, "is reckoned from the time harm
occurred/happened/was caused' (emphasis added). Using the "was caused" definition of ga shojita might
resolve the dilemma. For the nuances of the verb sh6jiru, see SANSEIDO'S NEW CONCISE JAPANESE
ENGLISH DICTIONARY 869 (1985).
230 See Gresser, supra note 80, at 143-46.
231 See Gresser, supra note 80, at 143-46.
232 Article 6 may preserve the courts' ability to administer both epidemiological and statistical
probability approaches to proof of causation. See discussion of article 6 infra.
233 See KITAGAWA, supra note 3, app. 4D-3. .
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demonstrates that the Act advances or alters the state of Japanese products
liability law only at the margin, if at all.234
As discussed in the analysis of article 3, the Act preserves the flaws
as well as the strengths of the previous products liability regime. Other,
systemic flaws are incorporated via the undiscriminating, catch-all article 6.
For example, an injured party who actually manages to locate a competent,
licensed attorney must pay a substantial up-front fee to secure represen-
tation, and disburse expensive court filing fees. 235 Moreover, high attorney
retainers and expensive filing fees are but two of several significant barriers
a plaintiff must initially overcome before going to trial. 236 The intermittent
nature of many Japanese trials may constitute another disincentive. 2 37
Unlike western-style civil jury trials, Japanese bench trials are composed of
intermittent hearings separated by long intervals.238 Overcrowded dockets
exacerbate delays. 239 Plaintiffs may not have the emotional and financial
fortitude to endure the lengthy and expensive trial process.240
234 For example, one past practice that may well continue under the current Act is the courts'
sliding scale for mandatory product safety levels. Cf Kitagawa (1989), supra note 39, § 4.05[5]. The
bench will likely remain free to set the level of safety a product "should normally have taking into
consideration its characteristics . . . or the like, and any other circumstances relating to the relevant
product." KITAGAWA, supra note 3, app. 4D-I. This language's inherent flexibility should allow the
courts to adjust the safety requirements for a given class of products, virtually guaranteeing the continued
viability of the special negligence doctrine for producers of food products, drugs, and chemicals. Kitagawa
(1989), supra note 39, § 4.05[5]; Fujita, supra note 1, at 71,72. As with fault apportionment, its continued
use should not alter greatly the Japanese products liability regime. Thus, Part II of this Comment may
function as a discussion of present, as well as previous, Japanese products liability law.
235 Assuming an exchange rate of US$1 = V100, a suit involving US$1,000,000 damages would
require a US$5,000 filing fee. See, e.g., Yamanouchi & Cohen. supra note 23, at 453 (table demonstrating
progressive-rate filing fee schedule); see also Miller, supra note 21, at 33. By comparison, any action
brought in a U.S. federal district court requires a US$120 filing fee. Yamanouchi & Cohen, supra note 23,
at 453. In Japan, the up-front retainer fee for the same suit would be US$30,000; an identical amount
would come due if plaintiff won. Yamanouchi & Cohen, supra note 23, at 448 (demonstrating statutory-
sliding scale retainer fee schedule); see also Miller, supra note 21, at 34. These sources are silent as to how
or where plaintiffs (other than the rich, who can afford such services-or the indigent, who are eligible for
legal aid get such funds.
23V One potential barrier lies in the fact that Japan's Rules of Civil Procedure do not recognize
formal class actions. See Ramseyer, supra note 25, at 631. However, mass-tort victims overcome this
barrier by forming informal associations that expedite trial preparation and settlement negotiations. See
Cohen & Martin, supra note 38, at 340.
237 Ramseyer, supra note 25, at 634; Ottley & Ottley, supra note 24, at 39.
238 Fujita, supra note 1, at 40. In contrast, Ramseyer notes that this trial format may allow the
parties to discern the judge's inclination before a final decision is reached, leading to multiple settlement
opportunities based on the expected outcome. Ramseyer, supra note 33. at 116-17.
239 Ramseyer, supra note 25, at 633-34.
240 While there is no a priori reason for a products liability statute to remedy a systemic problem
like trial delay, it remains important to understand that plaintiffs in a products liability suit face not only
substantive, but procedural barriers to litigation.
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If a plaintiff's case actually goes to trial, if the formidable burden of
proof is met,24 1 and if the plaintiff prevails, only limited damages are avai-
lable. 242 Civil Code articles 709 and 710 provide that plaintiffs may recoup
damages for physical and emotional harm,243 but these damages are usually
quite low. 244 Moreover, punitive damages are not awarded, 245 and awards
in lieu of lost future income do not account for inflation. 246 As noted
earlier, the judiciary apparently sets and enforces arbitrary award rates of its
own accord.247  Where damages are awarded, the plaintiffs attorney may
take as much as fifteen percent of the award as a "success fee"248 in addition
to his or her sizeable retainer fees. 249  Awards are often reduced in
proportion to the plaintiffs degree of fault,250 and in some cases,
241 Matsumoto, supra note 30, at 579.
242 Ottley & Ottley, supra note 24, at 39-40. Monetary remedies may be limited, but other
remedies are not: Japan Civil Code article 723 provides that a liable party shall restore the injured party's
reputation, which task may by accomplished in whole or in part by public or private apology through an
appropriate medium. Yamanouchi & Cohen, supra note 23, at 452; see also Colluquy, Discussion: The
Japan Experience, 15 U. HAW L. REv. 757-758, 761-762 (concerning apology as a tort remedy). Also,
criminal sanctions are available under Criminal Code article 211; charges have been brought against
defendant manufacturers on several occasions. Fujita, supra note 1, at 45, 47, 48, 51, 54. The charges
stuck in only two cases, and sentence was suspended in each. Fujita, supra note I, at 48, 51. Fujita also
reports that adept counsel would sometimes file a criminal complaint against a manufacturer named in a
previous civil suit, in the hopes that the government would exercise its powers of compulsory discovery
where counsel had none. Apparently, prosecutors are now wise to this maneuver. Fujita, supra note 1, at
46.
Where the Act does not address the issue of damages, articles 12-14 of the 1975 Draft Law
does. Fujita, supra note I, at 91. The Act's failure to address damages must irk plaintiffs and defendants
alike. See, e.g., Shigeno, supra note 139, at 28 ("industry is urging the necessity of standardizing damage
payment costs in order to prevent research and development from slowing.").
Many of the Draft Law's provisions (such as mandatory products liability insurance, trust
deposits, and so forth, see Fujita, supra note 1, at 91) appear to be embodied in modem ADR mechanisms.
The new Act makes no mention of the ADR mechanisms.
243 Fujita, supra note 1, at 18. Fujita reports that because the Civil Code does not specify any
formula for damages, courts apply both the Hoffman and Reipnitz formulae in calculating lost income.
Fujita, supra note 1, at 19.
244 Yamanouchi & Cohen, supra note 23, at 45 1.
245 Yamanouchi & Cohen, supra note 23, at 451.
246 Hamada et al., supra note 21, at 103. However, the Hoffman and Reipnitz damages formulae
allow for interest accruing at the judicial rate, which Fujita reports as five percent. Fujita, supra note 1, at
19.
247 Miller, supra note 21, at 35; HALEY, supra note 9, at 115; Matsumoto, supra note 30, at 579.
248 Yamanouchi & Cohen, supra note 23, at 448 (citing Japan Federation of Bar Associations'
Regulations Concerning the Standards for Attorney's Fees, Etc.).
249 But see Ramseyer & Nakazato, supra note 37, at 276 n.42 (a successful plaintiff in tort may
recover partial attorney's fees).
250 Courts applied a comparative fault analysis in five out of twelve single-injury cases where
plaintiff prevailed. See ARITA, supra note 56, at 68-74.
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comparative fault may offset most of the award.25' As a result, products
liability suits in general, and single-injury cases in particular, seem an unat-
tractive legal remedy.252 Additionally, a litigant seeking injunctive rather
than monetary relief will discover that judges lack the power to enforce
court orders. 253 It seems that Japan has earned its reputation for a low rate
of litigation 254 and that consumer centers and other ADR mechanisms
remain busy for good reason. 255
Yet, the Act does not address in any way the judiciary's relationship
to the many ADR mechanisms. The Act's shortcomings leave the courts
powerless to review, alter, or influence in any way the liability policy
implemented through the ADR mechanisms. 256 By denying the courts the
power to review ADR proceedings, the Act raises the specter of a products
liability system with double, or even multiple standards. There may be one
set of solutions for cases resolved through the legal system and another set
or sets of solutions for cases resolved through the various ADR mecha-
nisms. This lack of integration virtually guarantees that a severely injured
plaintiff must seek redress in several arenas simultaneously to guarantee
sufficient compensation. It is unfortunate at best, destructive and disruptive
at worst, and further compromises a severely-injured plaintiff's chances of
success in a single-injury case. 257
251 Kitagawa (1989), supra note 39, § 4.05[8] n.37. But see ARITA, supra note 56, at 72 (reporting
the opposite ratio of liability, in favor of plaintiff).
2 Cf Cohen & Martin, supra note 38, at 330; Fujita, supra note 1. at 70, 74. The disincentives
for single-injury lawsuits are heightened by the fact that local consumer centers and other administrative
remedies offer the option of settling for a sum certain now rather than waiting for an indeterminate award
later. Hamadaet al., supra note 21, at 87-88. See also Ramseyer, supra note 25, at 634 n.184.
253 HALEY, supra note 9, at 118.
254 See discussion supra note 37.
255 Cf Hamada et al., supra note 21, at 87 ("[Clonsumer centers serve a very important function for
Japanese citizens, most of whom are reluctant to take these matters as far as lawsuits.").
256 As mentioned earlier, see supra note 244, the provisions of the 1975 Draft Law incorporated
ADR mechanisms, while the new Act makes no mention of them. The Draft Law provisions left the ADR
mechanisms under the control and supervision of the courts, which would have ensured a uniform system
enforcing one set of rules and remedies. The new Act silently and permanently deprives the courts of any
supervisory role, effectively creating two entirely separate products liability systems. See. e.g., Kitagawa
(1989), supra note 39, § 4.09[2] ("[treatment of products liability cases at consumer centers is
substantially different from that in the courts").
257 Again, Leflar writes:
If one of the goals is to keep administrative costs down, the Japanese system certainly is
successful. If one goal is to achieve equity in damage recoveries among the injured, Japan is
relatively successful in that respect as well, at least to the extent that the injured engage the
system. If a goal is to keep the development of safety standards in administrative hands and out
of the reach of the courts and plaintiffs' attorneys, the system generally works very well indeed.
In times past, the courts have served as a channel for public participation; that role appears to
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V. CONCLUSION
The new Act changes the Japanese products liability regime very
little. In many ways, the Act recapitulates the prior judicial development of
the principles underlying the Civil Code articles. Where the Act does not
recapitulate that prior judicial development, it limits the scope of judicial
discretion and interpretation. In some instances, the Act reverses the prior
judicial development of liability. These limitations and reversals indicate
that Japan's substantive products liability law may not undergo subsequent
development as a tool for redressing injury or halting injurious practices.
258
Further, the Act fails to address the many structural and procedural
impediments to suit. Indeed, the Act creates new impediments, because it
divides Japan's products liability system into two distinct regimes: one
enforced via the courts and the other enforced via ADR mechanisms outside
the legal system. The cumulative, resonant effect of these three
factors-the division into separate legal and administrative regimes; the
procedural and structural barriers to suit; and the Act's reliance on the
previous Code-based system-ensures that the 1994 Products Liability
Act's uniform "strict liability" system will not function as intended.
have diminished in significance. But if the goals of systematic compensation and injury
prevention are considered important, then with the possible exception of traffic accident
compensation, one has to look outside the Japanese legal system for their fulfillment.
Leflar, supra note 37, at 756.
258 Put more succinctly, the Act has frozen the field of substantive products liability law in Japan.
See Professor Haley's observation, supra note 8. The freeze will be deepened by the recent downturn in the
use of lawsuits as a tool for social activism. Cf Tanaka, supra note 103, at 737-38.
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